Foreword by Janusz Onyszkiewicz This report is the second in a series presented by politicians and analysts associated with the Euro-Atlantic Association. Like the authors of the former study ("Poland and NATO"), those who compiled it aimed first of all to convey the opinions of a wide circle of the Association's members as expressed in the course of numerous meetings and seminars. This report, dealing with NATO enlargement, is extremely timely. As final decisions are fairly close at hand, certain practical aspects of the enlargement, including the question of its costs, have now moved to the forefront of public debate. Some attempts have already been made to assess the costs of NATO enlargement. The best known and, at the same time, most often challenged estimate has been presented by the US Congressional Budget Office. This paper uses an entirely different methodology which, in our view, represents a more realistic approach to the task of estimating the cost of the enlargement. What the authors underscore first of all is the need to make a distinction between what Poland will have to spend in order to modernize and reorganize its armed forces in general, and the costs directly connected with joining the Alliance. The report appropriately focuses on expenditures aimed at achieving the requisite level of compatibility and interoperability with NATO forces, while focusing less attention on the cost of modernizing the country’s armed forces. Critics may argue that the admission to NATO is a major factor forcing Poland to reform its defense system. CBO estimates are based on that assumption. Therefore a few important points must be noted. First, we must determine, what level of combat power the Polish armed forces should maintain, and what missions they should be capable of performing. To put it simply, the Polish armed forces should be strong enough to face military challenges resulting from local conflicts or limited-scale regional conflicts. In case of a more serious threat, Allied assistance may prove necessary. Such assistance, however, will not be the result only of NATO security guarantees extended to new members, but will be driven by the interest of NATO countries in overcoming serious threats to European security. The probability of an unexpected large-scale attack is very small, given the current level of confidence-building contacts and agreements and the technical means including airborne surveillance to detect major troop movements. Moreover, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in a decline in the military potential from the region between the Elbe and the eastern border of Belarus. Any changes within this zone would provide a clear and early warning, allowing enough time for necessary preparations. Thus, one has to conclude that Poland's admission to NATO need not entail as vast an enlargement of the Alliance's military infrastructure, as was in the case of Germany. Second, the quality of the armed forces of some current NATO states, even those which, in the cold-war period, were considered as front-line members (Greece and Turkey) fall far behind that of the Bundeswehr, and the British forces stationed on the Rhine, not to mention the US army. For example, Greek and Turkish armored divisions are basically equipped with M47 or M48 tanks, which can hardly compete with T-55, to say nothing of T-72 tanks. Similar disparities are found in other military branches. In view of these facts it seems perfectly clear that " ... NATO enlargement would cost as much, or as little, as the Alliance decides to spend for this purpose." according to a certain high official of the US administration. Similarly, in the opinion of the British Deputy Chief of Staff, Air-Force Marshal Peter Squire, NATO enlargement will not entail new expenditures since potential costs might be covered by re-allocating the existing capabilities. All the same, one has to consider the possibility - however slim it may seem - of an outbreak of a major European conflict comparable to that of 1939-1945. Let us recall that during World War II Polish naval ships and Polish pilots became perfectly capable of participating in Royal Navy and RAF operations in a few months. The same was true of other Polish units, such as, the Rifles Brigade which distinguished itself in the battle of Narvik in 1940. For summation, the cost of NATO enlargement presents no major difficulty to either new or current members. There is time enough to invest in the future in order to build a new Alliance capable of facing the challenges of the 21st century. The present paper is subtitled: "A Contribution to the Debate". It contains the first Polish cost estimate for joining NATO. As an organization whose purpose is to study foreign policy and security matters, the Euro-Atlantic Association hopes the document will help to make the Polish voice heard in the on-going debate.